New Russian
systems in Syria track every Israeli fighter right on takeoff, thus limiting operational
freedom against Hezbollah ● Deciphering Putin's real intentions ● How Iran
could be the big winner in Mosul.
Amos Harel
Oct 23, 2016 9:02 AM
Over the past
few weeks, Russia has finished beefing up its aerial defenses in northern
Syria. The Washington Post, after interviewing American experts, published a
map last week showing the estimated radius of coverage of Russia’s S-300 and
S-400 systems, which are bolstered by anti-aircraft missiles on ships in the
port of Tartus. The 380-kilometer radius covers Lebanon, much of Turkey and
Jordan, the eastern Mediterranean until out beyond Cyprus, a bit of Iraq, and
Israel all the way to the northern Negev.
The paper
said the Pentagon isn’t sure whether, if necessary, it could penetrate these
aerial defense systems, since the question hasn’t yet arisen. Presumably,
America has electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting even dense
anti-aircraft coverage. But the Post said Russia’s coverage limits Washington’s
ability not only to launch air strikes on Syrian military targets, but also to
create no-fly zones to protect civilians, an idea both U.S. presidential
candidates say they support.
Russia’s
beefed-up deployment also affects Israel, which, according to foreign media
reports, has launched numerous air strikes on arms convoys from Syria to
Hezbollah in recent years. Based on the Washington Post’s map, an Israeli plane
couldn’t take off from Tel Nof airbase without being tagged by Russian radar.
Ever since it
destroyed Syria’s anti-aircraft systems in 1982, Israel’s air force has enjoyed
absolute aerial superiority (and therefore, almost complete freedom of action)
on the northern front. But that effectively ended the moment Russia decided to
beef up its aerial defenses around Tartus. Almost without effort, the Russians
managed to restrict the strongest air force in the Middle East.
The
limitations aren’t just military, but also diplomatic. Israel and Russia have
set up a mechanism to prevent clashes in Syrian airspace, and Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu has met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin four times over the last year to further that
purpose.
Having no
other choice, Netanyahu has nurtured his Russian romance. But in reality, this
romance is about as romantic as Donald Trump’s groping of women. It’s a romance
to which Israel was forced to consent once the Russian bear decided to move
into its backyard.
Russia
apparently reinforced its aerial defenses in response to American condemnations
of its bombing of Aleppo, and due to concern, apparently unwarranted, that the
Obama administration might actually take military action against Syrian President
Bashar Assad. Though Russia’s economy is crumbling, Putin keeps pushing the
envelope, including with frequent hints about the danger of nuclear war,
attempts to sabotage the U.S. presidential election and surprising moves in the
Mideast, like this month’s announcement that Russia and Egypt will hold a joint
military exercise.
But since
Russia invests great effort in confusing and deterring its rivals, its real
intentions are hard to decipher. And the fact that Israel’s intelligence
community curtailed research into Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed
doesn’t make understanding Putin’s plans any easier.
The journal
“Eshtonot,” published by Israel’s National Defense College, made a first effort
to explore these questions in depth in its latest issue. This issue features a
wide-ranging analysis of Russia’s intervention in Syria, its strategic
significance and operative lessons by Dr. Dmitry Adamsky, a senior lecturer at
the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya who also teaches at military colleges.
Adamsky
described the Kremlin’s decision making as a well thought-out process based on
long-term strategic thinking. He said Russia sees itself as engaged in
self-defense against Western aggression in both Eastern Europe (the conflict in
Ukraine and efforts to expand NATO) and the Arab world (NATO’s operation in
Libya and the West’s abandoned effort to promote regime change in Syria).
Russia’s
intervention in Syria, he wrote, is its first such move of the post-Soviet era
and its biggest military operation since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The Russian army’s Central Command rehearsed the operation, code-named
Operation Caucasus 3, about two months before sending forces to Syria in
September 2015.
Russia had
two main reasons for intervening, Adamsky wrote. First, it wanted to protect
Assad’s regime, and through him Russia’s interests in Syria – first and
foremost its warm-water port in Tartus. Second, it feared that a victory by
Sunni jihadists in Syria would spur Islamist terror inside Russia. Russia has
at least 20 million Muslims, mostly Sunnis, and the uprising against Assad has
attracted thousands of volunteers from the Caucasus.
Russia, he
continued, feared the Assad regime was about to fall, and that a rebel victory
would deprive it of both its foothold on the Mediterranean and its web of
alliances in the region.
In addition,
Russia wanted to break its international isolation and weaken the sanctions
imposed on it over the fighting in Ukraine. Sending forces to Syria diverted
Western attention from Ukraine and forced the West to treat Russia as a key
player in the Mideast and worldwide.
The Russians
sought to restore the contiguity of the areas under Assad’s control and thereby
spark diplomatic negotiations that would protect their interests. Their combat
doctrine, brutal methods of fighting and desired end game were all based on
their experience in the Second Chechen War a decade earlier, which ended in
complete victory for Moscow.
After a year
of fighting in Syria, Adamsky wrote, Russia can allow itself to be cautiously
optimistic.
But the same
isn’t true of Israel, he implied. Since Hezbollah is participating in the
Russian-led campaign, the organization is learning sophisticated Russian combat
doctrines and tactics. This knowledge could greatly increase its military
capabilities, especially in deploying special forces to rack up offensive
achievements in a future clash with Israel.
Adamsky’s
article would seem to be required reading for senior Israeli military
officials. Russia’s presence in Syria has sharply changed the strategic reality
in which the Israel Defense Forces operates.
And as an
aside, the defense minister’s office is currently occupied by someone who grew
up on the doctrine of Soviet might and views the world suspiciously and
skeptically. So perhaps Adamsky’s article might also help IDF officers to
better understand Avigdor Lieberman.
Russia’s
success in Syria isn’t yet complete, nor has Putin met his original timetable.
In autumn 2015, he expected a three-month offensive in which Russian air power
and Syrian troops, with Iranian backing, would capture Aleppo and Idlib and
clear the rebels from northeast Syria. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who heads the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force, visited Moscow and promised to send
more than 2,000 Revolutionary Guard fighters, and Russia hoped this would end
the most active and dangerous phase of its Syrian intervention.
The Iranian
forces did arrive, but other problems quickly emerged. Assad’s troops, worn
down by years of fighting, barely functioned; Hezbollah suffered heavy losses;
and Iran’s spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, ordered the Iranian troops home,
leaving only a few hundred advisers in Syria. This forced Russia to move to
plan B, exemplified by its carpet bombing of Aleppo in recent months – a war
crime committed in full view of the world, with no regard for the consequences.
Assad has
regained some territory and blocked the rebels’ momentum. But the Sunni rebels
haven’t stopped fighting, and so far, Russia’s intervention doesn’t seem to
have brought the end of the war any nearer.
While the
Americans are letting Russia do as it pleases in Syria, they are focusing on
Iraq. This week the Iraqi army, backed by Shi’ite militias and American forces,
began its drive to oust ISIS from Mosul. The timing isn’t coincidental. Aside
from the favorable weather conditions, the U.S. presidential election is just
three weeks away, so the Obama administration wanted a display of military
might to compensate somewhat for its weakness in the face of the ongoing Syrian
slaughter.
The Mosul
offensive is expected to end in an Iraqi victory. But the Americans haven’t
given enough thought to what will happen the day after. Already, there are
signs of tension between Iraq’s Shi’ite government, the Kurdish forces attacking
from the north and Turkey, which is helping from the air, over who will rule
the city. America will have trouble preventing massacres of Mosul’s Sunni
population by Shi’ite militias. And apparently it is deliberately ignoring the
benefits Tehran will reap if Iraq’s Shi’ite government wins the battle with
overt Iranian aid.
The Obama
administration is also ignoring Iran’s role in the launch of missiles at
American ships by Houthi rebels in Yemen. Tehran is the one arming the Houthis,
and thus has influence over their actions. By turning a blind eye to Iranian
provocations and subversion throughout the Middle East, Washington is enabling
Tehran to increase its regional influence.
The reason is
obvious: It wants to protect its nuclear agreement with Iran. And for this end,
it seems virtually all means are kosher, from making Iran its de facto partner
(in Iraq but also, appallingly, in Syria, where Tehran is abetting Assad in
mass murder) to exaggerating the deal’s benefits.
In service of
the latter goal, Washington has taken several Israeli intelligence assessments
out of context. These assessments don’t share Netanyahu’s total pessimism about
the deal. But the Obama administration’s attempts to paint them as enthusiastic
over it are far from the truth.
Original
post: haaretz.com
Image - aviationweek.com
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