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Cobra Gold – Image: From the net
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Under the doctrine of “America First,” the Thai military regime has
enjoyed warming relations with the United States. However, economic and
development opportunities with China have pulled Thailand into China’s orbit.
Does the U.S. have the chance to increase its engagement in Thailand – or will
China emerge as the preeminent economic and security guarantor in Southeast
Asia?
Following the Thai military coup in 2014, the United States
withdrew support its support for the new
military regime. The U.S. canceled a series of visits, downgraded its level
of engagement and suspended military assistance to this country. Joint military
exercises proceeded as planned, but on a smaller scale and under restricted
conditions. Since 2013, U.S.
participation in the exercises has dropped to an annual commitment of
3,600 troops, down from 9,500.
The U.S.-Thailand alliance boost
However, by emphasising “America First,” the Trump administration
has shifted U.S. foreign policy priorities to emphasize American trade and
strategic interests over democracy and human rights. The U.S.-Thailand
relationship has gradually thawed, and both countries are resuming strategic
dialogues and military interactions. In February, the U.S. Pacific Command
chief Admiral Harry Harris attended this year’s Cobra
Gold joint military exercise, while in August, the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency approved the sale
of Harpoon Block II Missiles to Thailand.
In
a joint statement between Thailand and the U.S. made at the recent
Trump-Prayut White House summit in early October, both sides committed to
further defense cooperation. The statement emphasizes in particular the larger
role Thailand is expected to play in resolving tension on the Korean Peninsula
and in the South China Sea. In the economic realm, the U.S. anticipates an
increase in Thai imports of U.S. goods and investment in the United States to
underpin an expansion of trade ties with Bangkok and create more U.S. jobs. For
Prayut’s regime, these renewed commitments can help the developing Thai economy
and bolster the legitimacy of the military regime. Thailand urges more U.S.
businesses to invest in Thailand and the Eastern Economic Corridor initiatives
to support its Eastern Seaboard growth.
Bangkok’s shift toward Beijing
Washington’s criticism of the 2014 coup, its reduction in military
assistance to Bangkok, and its decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership have all pushed Thailand closer to China economically and
strategically.
The Chinese economic footprint in Thailand has rapidly expanded in
the last ten years. From 2006 to 2016, Chinese foreign direct investment in
Thailand increased from 1 to 15%, supplanting the U.S. as one of Thailand’s top
economic partners. In addition, Thailand has become an important consumer of
Chinese arms and military equipment. For instance, Thailand
signed an order for 28 VT-4 battle tanks and approved a bill to buy a
Chinese submarine.
Because of its pivotal position, Thailand plays an important role
in China’s “One
Belt One Road” initiative. Economic engagement with China promises several
development opportunities, including the construction of the Kra Isthmus Canal
and a high-speed rail line. For China, a canal in Kra Isthmus connecting the
Andaman Sea in the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea would create an
alternative to transit through the Strait of Malacca. Currently, nearly
one-third of global trade and one-third of all oil and natural gas pass through
the Strait—a critical vulnerability in China’s energy supply chain. The
Sino-Thai high-speed rail line would create an invaluable land route linking
China’s Yunnan province to the canal, Singapore, and the Strait of Malacca. The
two projects would strengthen Thailand’s role as the transport hub in the
region, boost its economic growth, and contribute to the Eastern Economic
Corridor project.
Challenges and opportunities
The foundations laid by the Trump-Prayut summit present an
opportunity for both sides to benefit and expand. For the Trump administration,
it could provide precisely the reversal the U.S. needs for its strained
alliances in Southeast Asia. The Thai government under Prayut could use this
opportunity to address key economic and security concerns and recalibrate Thai
foreign policy to more carefully balance its interests between China and the
United States. Trump’s upcoming attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit and the East Asia Summit in November will be a valuable
opportunity for U.S. to lay out its approach toward Thailand and Southeast
Asia, as many have perceived the summits as a litmus test of U.S. engagement.
Even though some improvements have been made in repairing the
relationship between these two countries, other strategic challenges will take
longer to resolve. The United States remains concerned over Thailand’s close
relationship with China and Thailand must navigate the many uncertainties
surrounding the Trump administration’s policy in Asia. Although Bangkok has thus
far remained neutral in regional competition between China and the United
States, conflict in the region could disrupt this delicate balance. Because
Thailand is neither a claimant in the South China Sea disputes nor taken a
strong stand against China’s growing military presence in the region, where it
falls in the balance between the United States’ and China’s regional influence
will depend on how each side nurtures opportunities like the Trump-Prayut
summit.
Original post: globalriskinsights.com
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