Marines
Want More Second-Hand F-5 Aggressors And A Light Attack Aircraft
The USMC
wants to expand both its capacity and capability when it comes to organic
tactical air training for its fast-jet communities.
BY TYLER ROGOWAY MARCH
31, 2017
The USMC's 11
F-5Ns and single F-5F just won't do it anymore when it comes to providing fleet
adversary support for dozens of Marine fast-jet squadrons. Now the Corps wants
to procure more second-hand F-5s from around the globe to bolster its aggressor
ranks, and to set up F-5 detachments at three other bases in addition to
VMFT-101 "Sharpshooters'" home base at MCAS Yuma in Arizona. In
addition, the Marine Corps master aviation plan also calls for adding a light
attack turboprop aircraft to its tactical training fleet, such as the AT-6C Coyote
or A-29 Super Tucano.
The Marine's
call for more adversary support capacity has been a long time coming—I have
written extensively on the subject dating back many
years. The introduction of the F-35 in particular will continue to grow
adversary support demand based on cost concerns alone.
The Joint Strike Fighter
will cost at best a third more to operate than the majority of aircraft it
replaces, and that number is likely going to be much larger in reality. Then
there is the fact that training depletes airframe life, which is a given, but
when the aircraft an F-35 is training against could just as easily be a F-5, it
makes little sense to use another F-35, or a tired legacy Hornet for that
matter. When the jet, in this case the F-35B, costs $120 million and has
a service life of 8,000 hours, $15,000 is being depreciated off the aircraft
every hour it flies.
The Navy and
the Pentagon have learned the hard way what a depleted tactical air force looks
like, as all three services struggle with aging fighters that have had
near-literally their wings flown off over a 16 years of perpetual warfare. Even
the young F-22 fleet has largely been augmented by incorporating T-38
aggressors at a squadron level. This is not only to better challenge the F-22,
which has a huge capacity for chewing through enemy targets, but it is also to
save precious F-22 airframe life and save money on operating the expensive
Raptors in the process. In essence, when a fast group of aerial targets is
needed, using other F-22s to provide this has been deemed a waste.
Keeping this
in mind, burning hours on advanced fighters in training where much less
expensive aircraft could adequately fill the role may not just make sense, but
it may be a fiscal necessity, too. The services are already struggling to afford to fly the fighter fleets they have, yet alone
ones dominated by expensive 5th generation stealth fighters in the
future.
The USMC
makes sums up its case for more F-5s, stating:
The F-5 fleet
consistently meets readiness goals while supporting as many MAGTF adversary
commitments as possible based on limited structure. USMC adversary requirements
have grown significantly over the past thirteen years of combat operations.
Today, the adversary capacity gap is growing, with VMFAT-501 (F-35B FRS)
requiring more than 1,500 per year and MAWTS-1 requiring more than 420 annually
from VMFT-401. Some of the additional requirements that have increased
adversary demands are:
1) FY10 MAWTS-1 reconstitutes Marine Division Tactics Course for the F/A-18 fleet
2) FY13 AV-8B training and readiness manual increases focus on additional air defense
capabilities
3) FY15 Continued transition of legacy TACAIR to F-35
4) TBD VMFAT-502 (2nd F-35 FRS) stand-up at MCAS Beaufort
1) FY10 MAWTS-1 reconstitutes Marine Division Tactics Course for the F/A-18 fleet
2) FY13 AV-8B training and readiness manual increases focus on additional air defense
capabilities
3) FY15 Continued transition of legacy TACAIR to F-35
4) TBD VMFAT-502 (2nd F-35 FRS) stand-up at MCAS Beaufort
The Marines'
reasoning for wanting more F-5s makes sense. In recent years, the AV-8B+ in
particular, with its relatively new AIM-120 AMRAAM capability, has put an extra
strain on the USMC's adversary support capabilities. Now with the F-35B
standing up on a grand scale, and the establishment of a "graduate
level" tactics course tailored to the legacy Hornet community, the demand
for the F-5's services has skyrocketed even higher. But the USMC's
justification does not clearly identify the aforementioned underlining issue
that flying an F-35 against another F-35 for many air-to-air training tasks is
a massive waste of money and airframe life, and it is likely unsustainable as a
whole.
The USMC
aviation plan describes the F-5's effectiveness and future:
The plan
continues to lay out how the F-5s should be redistributed:
"Further
desired expansion of the F-5 program, to potentially include a permanent
footprint at MCAS Beaufort in FY18, and conceptual plans for adversary elements
at MCASs Miramar, Yuma, and Cherry Point are being explored. Efficiently
colocating adversary support with the operational forces generates the most
readiness for our operational forces at the least cost. Composite training
squadrons beneath 4th MAW will also leverage on extensive TACAIR experience and
contribute to enhanced Reserve integration across aviation... Procurement of
numerous F-5s with significant service life remaining would allow the USMC to
meet, with organic assets, most requirements for adversary training. The first
phase of expanded adversary capacity will be to establish a detachment on the
East Coast in support of VMFAT-501 at MCAS Beaufort, S.C. for F-35 pilot
production requirements."
In addition
to wanting more F-5s spread across key locations, the USMC also wants to
procure a light air support aircraft for training purposes. These aircraft
could work not just in concert with an expanded F-5 adversary corps, but also
for training Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACS), airborne forward air
controllers, and providing a basic airborne surveillance and fire support
platform for other training purposes. This would all be part of a greater shift
in tactical air training strategy called the Composite Training Squadron
Concept.
The report states:
"USMC
fixed wing adversary and fleet Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and ForwardAir
Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)) training requirements will persist, and likely
grow. Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation is examining alternatives and
solutions for these high demand/low density adversary and CAS training
platforms.The Marine Corps composite training squadron concept could address
those needs. This squadron, likely in 4th MAW, would provide low cost,
regionally distributed adversary and light attack-capable fixed-wing airframes
to support fleet aviation and TACP/FAC(A) production, while improving readiness
across the MAGTF... Research is ongoing to examine low-cost turbo-propeller
aircraft alternatives to employ alongside the F-5. Marine aviation is examining
options to purchase and/or lease contractor-owned and maintained airframes that
could be operated by USMC aviators from the composite training squadron and
local flying units... An ordnance-employing light attack turbo prop airframe
with variable communication and sensor suites would help support all air and
ground terminal attack control training requirements. Procurement of additional
F-5s with significant service life remaining along with leasing or procuring a
light ordnance capable turbo prop could allow the USMC to meet, with a
combination of organic assets and contracted solutions, most of the
requirements for adversary training and appropriately augment close air support
for TACP and FAC(A) training
Procuring a
light attack aircraft like the USAF's A-29 Super Tucano or the AT-6C Coyote
would bring a cost effective, organic, fixed-wing aerial training asset to the
USMC that can do a lot of things for many different critical players in the
force. It could also potentially lead to fielding a similar aircraft in a
combat role, something the USMC has not had for decades, with the OV-10 Bronco being the last platform with a similar
mission.
After flying
the life out of their tactical fast-jet fleet, the USAF has finally come to the conclusion that it needs
an aircraft like this, and the USMC may arguably have a greater need for it
than any other service. Reading between the lines, fielding a light air support
aircraft for USMC training could be a backdoor way of potentially introducing
the concept back into the front-line force.
As you can
see below, it seems the USMC wants to roughly double its F-5 fleet, from 12 to
24, and then add an additional 24 light attack aircraft to go along with them
at four key bases around the US.
All this is
all good and well, but what's missing is the contractor option. There is a
growing list of adversary support companies that provide solutions for all
these mission sets, including JTAC training, "red air" services, and
the like. By using a contractor to expand its aerial training capacity instead
of doing it organically could provide the USMC with a cheaper and more elastic
solution. As the F-35 matures and hundreds of the 5th generation fighters fill
the USMC's ranks, outsourcing adversary support will be necessary
anyways.
On the other
hand, the Marine's F-5 fleet, with its private contractor support, is a cost
effective supersonic-capable adversary. And adding a light air support aircraft
to the USMC's inventory could have positive "springboard" effects as
we discussed earlier and it can work with the F-5s or alone to fulfill
lower-end aggressor commitments. But still, a heavier reliance on contractor
adversary support should be a part of the Marines' master air plan going
forward, especially since firms like the Airborne Tactical Advantage Company
(ATAC) have already successfully supplied thousands of hours of "red
air" training for the USMC and US Navy. In other words, the model is well proven.
Also clearly
mentioned in the USMC's master air plan is that the F-5 cannot provide all the
USMC's adversary support needs, and this is nothing new. Although the F-5 is
dissimilar to existing USMC tactical fixed-wing aircraft, and remains a highly
maneuverable and hard-to-spot foe, it can't replicate 4th generation fighter
threats adequately. Primarily, it lacks a capable radar system, and although
some modular radar options exist for the jet, their range is limited due to the
size of the array that can fit in the F-5N's platypus nose. Also, it is not
capable of maneuverability that reflects that of Flanker or Fulcrum
performance, among other potential enemy aircraft. This role is provided by
F/A-18s from the USMC, as well as NSAWC F-16s and fleet fighters from external
services like the US Navy, and to a lesser degree, the USAF.
Still, the
F-5 has room for enhancement. In addition to a radar upgrade, the jets could
make use of a helmet mounted display and a high-off boresight air-to-air
missile. Many off the shelf solutions exist for this capability, including
those from Israeli and European manufacturers. Additionally, Navy and USMC
F-5Ns have already received an internal electronic warfare suite in recent
years, with its emitters placed where the aircraft's 20mm gun barrels once
were. But this system is somewhat rudimentary and it could also be upgraded, or
foreign jamming pods, like the Elta EL 8222 self-escort jammer, could be procured to
better replicate a capable electronic warfare threat. Although these upgrades
would not give the F-5 a full 4th generation fighter capability, combined with
its small size, it would be one hell of an adversary.
There is
nothing to say that this 4th generation threat presentation requirement cannot
be outsourced to the private sector. Draken International currently flies A-4K Skyhawks
that pack a modified version of the APG-66 radar found on the F-16A/B. These
aircraft have been put under contract by the USAF to support aggressor
activities alongside the 64th Aggressor Squadron at Nellis AFB. Supposedly their
performance has been quite appreciated. Draken's L159 fighter-trainers
also pack the compact Selex Galileo "Grifo" pulse-doppler
radar. But these aircraft do not possess the raw performance of a true 4th
generation fighter. With this in mind, some adversary support providers are
looking towards more modern aircraft, such as the F-16, to provide a robust,
9G-capable threat presentation to customer air forces.
In the end,
no matter how the USMC acquires it, it is good news to hear they are looking to
invest more heavily in fleet adversary support as well as opening up to
procuring a light attack aircraft laden with advanced sensors and avionics,
even if it's just for training—at least for now. And who knows, the USMC's hunt
for more low-time F-5s may have already begun. The need for
more adversary F-5s, and possibly extensive upgrades to go along with them,
also serves as yet another reminder of how it is too bad Northrop's ultimate
F-5 evolution—the F-20 Tigershark—never made it into production, yet
alone the aggressor fleet.
Contact
the author: Tyler@thedrive.com
Original
post: thedrive.com
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